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Abstract This essay is an inquiry into the fundamentals of contemporary liberalism. I 
defend the following claim: the premises of contemporary liberal theory cannot avoid 
referring to the ideal of equality of individuals in some way. equality is a principle to orga­
nize the fundamental level of the theory from which to derive the principles for organi­
zing liberal institutions. To support these claims, I distinguish justificatory from perfectio­
nist liberalism, and then look into some of the most relevant theories of contemporary 
political philosophy that provide the ethical basis for contemporary liberalism.
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Introduction1
Liberal theory advocates institutions 
such as civic equality, freedom of speech 
and worship, division of power, non-dis-
crimination, and equal opportunity. 
Such institutions can be arrived at from 
different standpoints and conceptions of 
the good. However, in this paper I argue 
that one of the chief goals of contempo-
rary liberal thought is to construct a 
theory based on some sort of equality of 
* This paper was presented at the Third Cen-
tral and Eastern European Forum of Young 
Legal, Social and Political Theorists held in 
Belgrade, March 25-26, 2011.
individuals so that liberal institutions 
can be justified even to those who have 
no respect for liberal values. I do this by 
revisiting the ground floor level21 of the 
theory of John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, 
and Jürgen Habermas. Their theories 
contain a conceptualization of equality 
that is expressed by concepts such as 
strains of commitment, reasonable re-
jection, and the discourse principle, re-
1 The term ‘ground floor level’ refers to the 
fundamental level of the theory, a level from 
which we have to derive principles and insti-
tutions. For instance, in Rawls’s theory this 
level is designed as the original position. I 
























spectively (sections 5-7). I claim that 
such a theoretical groundwork offers a 
plausible basis for liberal theory to justi-
fy liberal institutions without referring 
to a comprehensive moral doctrine.
Before I look more closely into their 
theories, I should like to differentiate 
between two versions of contemporary 
liberalism: justificatory and perfection-
ist liberalism. My claim is that if liberal-
ism wants to be able to win the allegiance 
of those who denigrate liberal institu-
tions, it has to distance itself from the 
perfectionist approach. To perfection-
ists, like Joseph Raz, autonomy is the 
value that the government has to give 
priority in pursuing public policy. But I 
want to argue that liberals should resist 
his claim that ‘the value of personal au-
tonomy is the fact of life’ (Raz, 1986: 
394). I believe that the perfectionist ap-
proach has had a negative impact on the 
idea that liberal institutions present an 
acceptable ground for non-liberal con-
ceptions of the good life.
Perfectionists often like to say that 
their version of liberalism is more hospi-
table to liberal institutions than its neu-
tralist counterpart. This is a trivial sug-
gestion, but nevertheless has significant 
repercussions for liberalism in general. 
If liberals settle on the perfectionist ver-
sion, liberal institutions will be accepted 
only by those who already accept liberal-
ism as a moral doctrine. Over the last 
few years, several studies have addressed 
the issue of perfectionism in contempo-
rary liberalism (Stephen and Klosko, 
2003; Quong, 2011; Lister, 2013) Most of 
them defended the non-perfectionist 
kind of liberalism from the viewpoint of 
public justification. In this paper I want 
to expand on these insights by identify-
ing how the concept of equality fits into 
the non-perfectionist version of liberal-
ism. I claim that some kind of equality 
matters for liberalism.
But what kind of equality does liber-
alism require? I want to argue that the 
kind of equality liberalism needs is a 
form of a general principle for arranging 
a choice situation from which to select 
the principles of a just society. What I 
offer here is not an egalitarian theory. If 
we take the ideal of equality as a compo-
nent of egalitarian theory, equality 
should be understood in the following 
man ner: ‘All Fs who do not have G 
should have G if some Fs have it’ (Raz, 
1986: 225). Thus, having equality as a 
chief component of a theory must 
demonstrate that ‘it is in itself bad that 
some people are worse off than others’ 
(Parfit, 1997: 204).
In this essay, equality is understood 
neither as an intrinsic principle, nor as 
an ideal, but rather as an arranging prin-
ciple for the situation in which people 
hypothetically discuss what kind of in-
stitutions they would like to live under. 
The idea was expressed by Ronald Dwor-
 kin in his essay “Why Liberals Should 
Care About Equality”: ‘[Government] 
must impose no sacrifices or constraint 
on any citizen in virtue of an argument 
that the citizen could not accept without 
abandoning his sense of equal worth’ 
(Dworkin, 1985: 205). The key idea was 
clear: government which cares about 
equal ity must abstain from enforcing 
pri vate morals on others. Of course, 
Dworkin, whose theory was not con-
structivist, talked about a direct link be-
tween the government and equality. But 
I want to show that this idea can be 
found more broadly formulated in theo-
ries that, as it were, have two levels –  a 
level of premises and a level of institu-
tions.
This essay is an inquiry into the mor-











ism. However, I at no point want to sug-
gest that Scanlon’s and Habermas’s theo-
ries are the theories that advocate li beral 
institutions. Likewise, neither Scanlon, 
nor Habermas are liberal, nor are they 
thinkers who deal with justice. But I ar-
gue that moral concepts that can be 
found at the fundamental levels of their 
theories (reasonable rejection, discourse 
principle) can be used as foundations on 
which to build liberal institutions. Their 
theories reflect the ideal of equality by 
imposing reasonable constraints con-
cerning what kind of argument can be 
put forward in arguing for political prin-
ciples. These constraints eliminate the 
advantage that could lead to adopting 
partial principles of justice, and lay 
groundwork for a liberal theory of jus-
tice. Such groundwork is, in my view, 
essential for justificatory liberalism which 
I espouse on in this paper (section 2).
What is the contribution of this pa-
per? I am not formulating a new version 
of liberalism. I identify the main theo-
retical representatives of anti-perfec-
tionist liberalism by showing that, de-
spite their theoretical and conceptual 
differences as well as mutual debates, 
there is a unifying theme in all of them. 
Likewise, I am not debating the possibil-
ity of the kind of liberalism under con-
sideration here. I am only showing what 
other thinkers (some of whom are theo-
retical non-liberals) believed was a rea-
sonable ground from which liberal insti-
tutions could be justified to others.
Justificatory Liberalism
There are two types of liberalism. 
The first type is often referred to as ‘neu-
tral’ liberalism, but I prefer the term po-
litical liberalism. This line of thinking in 
contemporary political philosophy be-
gins with Rawls, and as I show here, can 
be found in the work of Scanlon, Barry, 
and Habermas (although, Scanlon’s and 
Habermas’s theories are not liberal 
themselves). The underlying idea of this 
variant of liberalism is that it does not 
directly advocate the dominant position 
of liberal institutions in public life, but 
instead wants to give reasons for the ac-
ceptance of liberal institutions. The idea 
is predicated on the fact of pluralism, 
under which it is not possible to formu-
late self-evident principles of justice that 
can be endorsed by every member of 
society.
This view is in stark contrast with the 
perfectionist view that starts from the 
autonomy of the person. It claims that 
only conceptions of the good that are 
autonomy-friendly should receive the 
sup port of government policy (Raz 1986). 
In other words, government will give 
priority only to those conceptions which, 
as it were, have the right pedigree (Barry, 
1995: 131), which are arrived at in an 
autonomous way, and which permit in-
dividuals to revise their conceptions of 
the good life (Kymlicka, 1989; 1995). 
The repercussion of such a view is that a 
whole array of conceptions of the good 
that cannot be squared with the autono-
my of the person, which is a distinctively 
liberal ideal, will be put at a disadvanta- 
ge by government action from the very 
start.
I want to show that, in contrast to 
the autonomy of the person, the princi-
ple of equality is a plausible ground from 
which to begin in order to select the 
principles for a just society. This leads to 
the following problem: can we, in a the-
ory of liberal institutions that are not 
underwritten by non-liberal conceptions 
of the good, begin from something that 
is distinctly liberal such as the concept of 
autonomy? I claim that we cannot. Rath-
























moral notions that can be argued to be 
acceptable to those who reject liberal 
institutions. I claim this is the principle 
of equality. At the fundamental level, it is 
essential to begin from equality because 
this is the value that has the capacity to 
lead towards the principles for organiz-
ing public institutions that can be en-
dorsed by everyone. Ground-floor equal-
 ity is, in different forms, present in the 
theories of John Rawls, Thomas Scanlon, 
and Jürgen Habermas, which I discuss in 
sections 5-7.
Conceptions of the Good
What should be treated equally at 
the ground floor level? I suggest that lib-
eralism sees people as equals with re-
spect to their conceptions of the good. 
John Rawls was the first to bring in the 
concept of a life plan in to political phi-
losophy (Rawls, 1971: 407-16). I define 
the conception of the good (or life plan, 
to use an alternative expression) as a set 
of personal values that a person thinks 
are worth pursuing. They can be derived 
from a broader theory or ideology (such 
as liberalism, communism, various types 
of nationalism, or some religious doc-
trine) but it can also be an idiosyncratic 
viewpoint. Conceptions of the good are 
always based on a comprehensive moral, 
political or religious doctrine (Rawls, 
1993: 13).
Perfectionist liberals, such as Raz, 
believe that conceptions of the good are 
valid only if they are arrived at in an au-
tonomous manner (Raw, 1986: 365-399). 
Similarly, in A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
insisted that valid life plans are only 
those plans which are rational, namely 
– ‘consisted with the principles of ration-
al choice when these are applied to all 
the relevant features of his situation’ 
(Rawls, 1971: 408).
Now, if we construct institutions that 
will reflect only these two requirements 
(autonomy of the person and rational 
choice), conceptions of the good that are 
essentially non-liberal will be disadvan-
taged. Believing that any conception of 
the good is valid as long as it is autono-
mously pursued or is a product of ra-
tional choice cannot result in legitimacy 
of liberal institutions.
Why is such a treatment of the con-
ceptions of the good unacceptable to 
justificatory liberalism? Because it auto-
matically leads to a specific political ac-
tion. Once you establish that only auto - 
no my-friendly conceptions of the good 
are valid, you will be obliged to protect 
and encourage them via the state’s au-
thority. Raz explains: ‘For it is the goal 
of all political action to enable individu-
als to pursue valid conceptions of the 
good and to discourage empty or evil 
ones’ (Raz, 1986: 133). To be sure, the 
aim of liberalism is to discourage evil 
political doctrines whose aim is to harm 
others. This aim has to be justified by 
referring to a broader moral concept 
that can com mand broader allegiance.
We could, therefore, allow for a more 
relaxed definition of a conception of the 
good that does not fall back on Aristote-
lian perfectionism but rather acknowl-
edges that ‘poetry is as good as a push-
pin.’ This acknowledgement can be 
couched in a form of what Janos Kis calls 
the humanist presumption, which says 
that ‘if (groups of) individuals are seri-
ously at tached to a conception of the 
good, then, unless there are very weighty 
reasons to the contrary, it has to be pre-
sumed that their conception represents a 
meaning ful human interest’ (Kis, 1997: 
33).
Those conceptions of the good that 
can be invited into the ground floor level 











tion 4. For now, it suffices to say that the 
ground floor level of the theory permits 
conceptions of the good that are not au-
tonomously pursued, are rational, or 
prone to constant revision. (For exam-
ple, someone who always firmly believes 
that a pushpin is as good as poetry will 
be treated equally as one who used to 
think that a pushpin was good as poetry 
but then changed her mind.) But we 
surely must agree that, whatever the 
plan, individuals must be given a chance 
to pursue their life plans and be reasona-
bly confident that their plans can be 
carried through. Life plans may vary, but 
it is important for liberalism that all life 
plans are equal in that they all have a 
prima facie equal claim to their fulfill-
ment. Thus, anybody can be said to want 
institutions as well as necessary resourc-
es for her plan’s implementation.
Impartiality and Neutrality
What concerns me here is equality at 
the fundamental (ground floor) level of 
the theory. The major distinction that 
distinguishes ‘fundamental level’ liberals 
from perfectionist liberals is that the lat-
ter have no fundamental level. This is 
understandable if one has in mind what 
is to be justified. Perfectionist liberals 
claim that governments have to pursue 
public policies that can be squared with 
the concept of autonomy. Conceptions 
of the good life that do not have the right 
pedigree (autonomy) will be disadvan-
taged in public life.
We can talk about two types of justi-
fication: if we justify a policy, then the 
fundamental level is not needed. Public 
policies are justified directly if they pro-
mote a liberal way of life grounded in 
autonomy. However, if we want to justify 
institutions, we need to begin from the 
ground floor up, as it were. Raz is right 
to point out that neutral liberals are 
known for believing ‘that there is a deep-
felt conviction that it is not within the 
right of any person to use the machinery 
of the state in order to force his concep-
tion of the good life on other adult per-
sons’ (Raz, 1986: 111). This is precisely 
why a two-level approach is needed. We 
need to justify principles that will estab-
lish a fair institutional framework within 
which it is possible to pursue whatever 
policies. What kind of policies will be 
adopted and pursued has nothing to do 
with the fundamental level. But when 
they are pursued, others, who do not 
endorse such policies, must be convinced 
that this pursuit is not unjust.
Let me sketch the basic argument at 
the ground floor level. It consists of three 
steps. Suppose we have a group of people 
who came together to decide under what 
kind of society they want to live. They 
still have no idea what the basic princi-
ples for such a society are, but they do 
know what their conceptions of the good 
are. Each individual is interested in de-
fending their conceptions of the good 
life. Moreover, no principle is acceptable 
to anyone as long as it is not demonstrat-
ed to be acceptable to everyone. Finally, 
each individual is aware that they cannot 
impose their conceptions of the good on 
other people. To put it a different way, it 
is impermissible for me to propose prin-
ciples regulating public institutions that 
would put your conception of the good 
at a disadvantage and favor mine.
But how do we accomplish this? Can 
we give a valid reason to anyone who 
believes that their conception of the 
good should serve as a basis for political 
institutions to abstain from imposing 
their moral doctrine on others? I believe 
that we can if we start from Rawls’s idea 
of original position, Scanlon’s test of rea-
























speech situation. Indeed, I think that 
these three moral concepts have had the 
most influence on contemporary liberal-
ism. At this point it suffices to say that 
the principle of equality leads us to an-
other basic concept that needs to be 
clarified – namely, that of impartiality.
I said in section 1 that I do not ac-
cept the term ‘neutral’ liberalism, for I 
think it creates more trouble than it 
solves. At this point, I am obliged to ex-
pand on what the term ‘deontological’ or 
‘justificatory’ means. Let me do this by 
distinguishing between the notions of 
‘impartiality’ and ‘neutrality.’
Some authors employ these two no-
tions interchangeably (Barry, 1995: 194-
5; Nagel, 1991: 99-100), or sometimes 
use similar notions (like toleration) to 
express the same idea (Nagel, 1991: 166). 
Impartiality appears at the fundamental 
level of the theory, whereas the notion of 
neutrality comes into view at the public 
policy level. ‘Neutrality is a distinctly 
political principle’ (Kis, 2012: 1); impar-
tiality is theoretical. Accordingly, one 
can talk about the impartiality of an 
original position on the one hand, and 
neutrality of the state or the government, 
on the other hand. Impartiality provides 
us with reasons as to why the parties 
should set aside their own conceptions 
of the good life when entering an origi-
nal position. Neutrality should provide 
people with sufficient reason not to pro-
test when public policy gives a head start 
to any particular conception of the good.
Impartiality entails that the funda-
mental level of the theory in which par-
ties are situated as equal must be derived 
from no particular conception of the 
good. Opting for the supreme status of 
one conception of the good often means 
putting others at a disadvantaged posi-
tion. Once it is recognized that the su-
preme status of any conception of the 
good has the capability of precluding 
other conceptions from furtherance – 
which deprives rational persons of the 
incentive to enter the original position 
– the case for impartiality at the ground 
floor level is justified. But whereas im-
partiality does not deal with conceptions 
of the good, neutrality deals with all of 
them. This is because neutrality takes all 
conceptions of the good as valid as op -
posed to impartiality that takes all of 
them, as it were, as invalid. Neutrality 
explains why people should regard gov-
ernment public policy as unproblematic 
even if it advances some particular con-
ceptions of the good. All neutrality de-
mands is that public institutions reflect 
equal concern for all of those concep-
tions of the good that exist in a society 
and work on promotion of these concep-
tions in general. This is easy to under-
stand given the fact that many policy 
decisions imply a Pareto improvement. 
But it does not mean that government is 
allowed to take only this sort of decision. 
To be sure, governments sometimes do 
take decisions that favor some concep-
tions of the good at the expense of oth-
ers. Yet, they cannot avoid taking deci-
sions on which public policy to pursue 
only because it will promote a concep-
tion of the good. This is simply not pos-
sible (Barry, 1995: 144-5).
When I say that deontological liber-
alism is impartial, I mean that I wish the 
parties at the ground floor level to be 
situated as equals, having no bargaining 
advantages over each other. Such a situa-
tion assumes that no one is able to use 
any advantage stemming from social, 
ethnic, or natural endowment facts in 
order to impose the principles that ben-
efit only some individuals or social, eth-
nic or religious groups. The information 
that conveys this knowledge must be 











formation necessarily implies some sort 
of veil of ignorance, which in Rawls’s 
case created as many problems as it 
solved. Therefore, instead of using the 
controversial device of the Rawlsian veil 
of ignorance, I say that the information, 
which could create advantages for some 
in an original position, may be known to 
the parties but may not be referred to 
when arguing for principles of justice. 
The idea is expressed by Andrew Arato: 
‘what we would then ask is not necessar-
ily whether the actors were actually ig-
norant about their interests […], but 
only whether they are willing to suspend, 
or rather to cancel out on the wishes and 
the arguments of their interlocutors the 
consequences of their actual knowledge’ 
(Arato, 2000: 249). It is essential that the 
parties at the ground floor level are 
aware of their conceptions of the good in 
order to be able to defend them. They are 
allowed to refer to them only in order to 
reject what is unjust. Can this be the 
solution to the problem? In other words, 
why would someone who rejects liberal 
values be willing to abstain from refer-
ring to the information creating advan-
tages for themselves? The simple answer 
is that the requirement not to refer to 
this kind of information contains no lib-
eral tinge. Obviously, the essence of the 
conceptions of the good for each indivi-
dual is of paramount importance. Equal-
 ity is only an instrument to achieve it.
Impartiality would thus mean the 
following: you can keep and try to im-
plement your conception of the good, 
but you must abstain from trying to im-
pose your conception of the good as a 
basis for designing political institutions. 
Let me give an example that clarifies 
this. Suppose you are a member of a cult 
that calls for the restoration of the ten 
commandments of god. In addition to 
believing that if the apocalypse were to 
occur in the year 3000, you as a member 
were required to abstain from having 
sex, using soap, and were allowed only 
one meal on Fridays and Sundays. To be 
treated equally and be represented at the 
ground floor level of the theory, you may 
stick to your cult and stand a good 
chance to continue its practices under 
liberal political institutions. However, if 
you believe that the only way for your 
conception of the good to thrive is that 
everyone else (who do not belong to 
your cult) must believe in doomsday, 
abstain from having sex and using soap, 
while eating a meal only twice a week, 
you would impose an unreasonable bur-
den on others (section 6), and would 
upset the principle of equality of the 
‘original position’.
As a follower of the cult, you would, 
therefore, have good reasons to accept 
the requirements of the ‘liberal original 
position’. However, everyone else would 
have good reasons to reject your concep-
tion of the good as a basis for designing 
political institutions that put everyone 
who does not follow your cult at a disad-
vantage.
The difference between impartiality 
(ground floor level) and neutrality (pub-
lic policy level) should be now clear: 
impartiality privileges no moral doc-
trine (conception of the good); in con-
trast, neutrality can sometimes (but not 
always) result in a policy that privileges a 
certain conception of the good. Yet, if 
institutional procedures under which 
such a policy has been produced are fair, 
no one has a reason to protest. Liberal 
institutions are such kind of institutions.
Rawls and the Strains of Commitment
The major thesis of this essay con-
sists in showing that any sort of justifica-
























the principle of equality. Hence, in this 
and the next two sections I take up the 
three prominent political thinkers – 
Rawls, Scanlon, and Habermas – and 
look into how they conceptualize equal-
ity and if they violate the requirements 
of impartiality set out in section 4.
The case of Rawls has usually been 
bound to rational choice and then to the 
idea of political liberalism. The former 
reflected a utilitarian influence; the latter 
perfectionism in his theory. Both aspects 
of Rawls’s theory have been abandoned. 
One thing that has never been aban-
doned but on which, it seems to me, 
Rawls never insisted persistently enough 
is the concept of the strains of commit-
ment. As I will show later, this concept is 
the most direct predecessor of Scanlon’s 
idea of reasonable rejection, which to-
day is probably the most efficient formu-
lation of how ground floor equality 
should be arranged.
Interestingly enough, the early works 
of Rawls contained the idea of how to 
construct principles of justice without 
referring to self-interest, rational choice, 
and the veil of ignorance. In his 1955 
essay “Justice as Fairness,” Rawls states 
that the starting point for the principles 
of justice is a moral one. The assumption 
that people are in a fundamental sense 
equal naturally leads towards the propo-
sition that ‘there must always be a justifi-
cation for departing from the initial po-
sition of equal liberty […], and the bur-
den of proof is placed on him who would 
depart from it’ (Rawls, 1955: 166). Rawls, 
to be sure, introduces self-interest as a 
driving motivational force, but the 
strains of commitment are supposed to 
remind the parties that any selected 
principles are binding for the future. 
Since everyone ‘understands that every-
one should make in advance a firm com-
mitment, which others also may be rea-
sonably expected to make, no one is to 
be given the opportunity to tailor the 
canons of a legitimate complaint to fit 
his own special condition’ (ibid.: 171-2). 
Rawls indeed does not explicitly state 
anywhere that moral motivation over-
rides self-interest, but to put forward the 
kind of argument that takes into account 
the possible disadvantaged position of 
others is possible only if a moral motiva-
tion with which no conception of the 
good is privileged in the original posi-
tion is presupposed. In a word, the pro-
cedure of the original position wherein 
people act on their conceptions of the 
good is a position that contains con-
straints that are ‘analogous to those of 
having a morality, whereby rational and 
mutually self-interested persons are 
brou ght to act reasonably’ (ibid.: 172).
The idea is fully elaborated in A The-
ory of Justice. The aim of the strains of 
commitment is the following. Once the 
deal among the parties to the original 
position is made, there is no going back. 
The agreements are made once and for 
all. Being fully aware of the possibility 
that there might be principles that im-
pose an unreasonable burden, which is 
avoidable under an alternative set of 
principles, Rawls says that the parties 
‘cannot enter into agreements that might 
have consequences they cannot accept. 
They will avoid those that they can ad-
here to only with great difficulty. Since 
the original agreement is final and made 
in perpetuity, there is no second chance’ 
(Rawls, 1971: 176). If it turns out that the 
agreement is bad for someone, those 
who finish on the losing side cannot step 
out of the agreement and call for a new 
round of negotiations. We have to pay 
special attention to what we agree to, for 












Accepting the principles that will put 
some conception of the good in jeopardy 
is tantamount to gambling. Thus, in 
what came as the final recomposition of 
his theory of justice, Rawls writes that:
given the conception of the person 
in justice as fairness, we say that the 
parties assume that, as persons with 
the two moral powers and a deter-
minate complete conception of the 
good, citizens have, among other in-
terests, certain religious, philosophi-
cal, and moral interests, and that the 
fulfillment of these interests must, if 
possible, be guaranteed. There are 
some things we cannot give up; they 
are not negotiable (Rawls, 2001: 104).
Rational choice and utilitarian prin-
ciples cannot be the outcome of the orig-
inal position if the parties take the 
strains of commitment seriously. And 
the later Rawls is explicit that ‘the parties 
are seen as making an agreement; it is 
not simply that they each separately make 
the same choice’ (ibid.: 102). Strictly 
speaking, the strains of commitment in-
duce parties to take the agreement, their 
conception of the good, and the princi-
ples of justice seriously. Only in this way 
will parties treat each other with equal 
respect. This is why parties opt for the 
institutional scheme that will be benefi-
cial for them even if they finish up in the 
worst off position. The difference princi-
ple is a principle that guarantees such an 
opportunity.
In discussing the strains of commit-
ment in this section, I wanted to show 
that one part of Rawls’s early theory of 
justice was part of justificatory liberal-
ism – namely, that the veil of ignorance 
is not essential to the choice of the prin-
ciples in the original position. This con-
tractual basis of deontological liberalism 
is possible only if we presume that in an 
original position people must be treated 
as equals, and that everyone knows that 
everyone is treated so. Equality here sat-
isfies the requirements of impartiality in 
that no party is in the position to impose 
their conceptions of good life on the 
lives of others.
Scanlon and Reasonable Rejection
Scanlon’s test of reasonable rejection 
emerged as an attempt to overcome the 
difficulties pertaining to Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance and its utilitarian nature. The 
major failure of the early Rawls was that 
his theory never succeeded in construct-
ing a social contract that no party could 
reasonably complain about or reject. By 
some accounts (Scanlon, 1982: 126-8; 
Barry, 1989: 335; 1995: 61-7), the wrong 
premise at the base of Rawls’s theory was 
that of motivation. Rawls’s individuals at 
the original position are self-interested 
people who, at best, will select the aver-
age utility principle (Harsanyi, 1975), the 
principle that Rawls declaratively want-
ed to avoid. One of the principal con-
cerns in A Theory of Justice was to prove 
that it is possible to derive liberal princi-
ples of justice from utilitarian premises. 
But if the parties are self-interested, they 
must act in the way Harsanyi says they 
do. The snag is this: if you want to derive 
liberal principles, you have to begin 
from more general liberal assumptions; 
if you want to derive utilitarian princi-
ples, you can begin from general utilitar-
ian assumptions. It is not possible to de-
rive liberal principles by starting from 
utilitarian assumptions. And this is what 
Rawls tried to do in A Theory of Justice.
Scanlon proposed a different type of 
motivation. Instead of being self-inter-
ested, individuals in Scanlon’s original 
position are equipped with a moral mo-
tivation, meaning that they care for oth -
























another way, the parties in the Scanloni-
an ‘original position’ are morally moti-
vated in that they do not want to propose 
principles of justice unless they are plau-
sible to everybody. Note that Scanlon 
here truly departs from the impersonal 
point of view: we care for others not be-
cause we may eventually end up in their 
place, but ‘to find principles that they, as 
well as us, cannot reasonably reject’ 
(Scanlon, 1998: 191). Therefore, the rea-
sonable rejection assumes that an act is 
wrong if no one can reasonably reject it 
(Scanlon, 1982: 111; 1998: 153).
The concept that does the job in 
Scanlon’s case is the concept of reasona-
bleness. Reasonableness is essentially 
other-regarding, meaning it is not my 
but your interest that has to be met first. 
A principle cannot be adopted if anyone 
can voice a grounded criticism. Thus, 
Scanlon writes:
When we say, in the course of an at-
tempt to reach some collective deci-
sion, that a person is being unrea-
sonable, what we often mean is that 
he or she is refusing to take other 
people’s interest into account. What 
we are claiming is that there is rea-
son to take these interest into account 
given the supposed aim of reaching 
agreement or finding a course of ac-
tion that everyone will be happy with 
(Scanlon, 1998: 33).
Scanlon’s reasonable rejection could 
be regarded as an elaboration of Rawls’s 
fundamental intuitions on justice ex-
pressed by the veil of ignorance (section 
5). If you begin, as Scanlon does, from 
the idea that everyone is prima facie 
equally entitled to lay claim on the selec-
tion of the principles of justice, you will 
simply see that your thinking about right 
and wrong is structured by a different 
kind of motivation. ‘This gives us direct 
reason to be concerned with other peo-
ple’s point of view: not because we might, 
for all we know, actually be them, […] 
but in order to find principles that they, 
as well as we, have reason to accept’ 
(ibid.: 191). Reasonableness thus can be 
seen as taking into account the interest 
of all.
With this, Scanlon tries to overcome 
the problems of Rawls’s theory with re-
spect to impartiality. Rawls wanted to 
achieve impartiality with the veil of ig-
norance, while Scanlon achieves it with 
the idea of reasonableness. Scanlon says 
that ‘a claim about what it is reasonable 
for a person to do presupposes a certain 
body of information and a certain range 
of reasons which are taken to be rele-
vant, and goes on to make a claim about 
what those reasons, properly under-
stood, in fact support’ (ibid.: 192). The 
idea of reasonableness performs the 
function of obscuring morally irrelevant 
information, to employ Rawls’s vocabu-
lary. As argued in section 4, it is not 
necessary that we have no access to the 
morally irrelevant information. What is 
required is that we do not have the ac-
cess to information in a required sense, 
meaning that we may use it in order to 
reject what is unreasonable, but must be 
precluded to draw on it in order to put 
forward the principles that benefit only 
us. Reasonableness blocks the kinds of 
arguments that are not permissible at the 
ground floor level. In this sense, the rea-
sonable differs from the rational.
All this solely points to the contrac-
tual nature in Scanlon’s theory. We still 
do not know when something may be 
rejected. This is explained by another 
ingredient of reasonableness – namely, 
the notion of burden. In the 1982 article 
(in which he introduced the idea), Scan-
lon wrote that ‘reasonable’ should neces-
sarily be joined with the notion of bur-











Rawls’s idea of separateness of the indi-
vidual, and its opposition to the utilitar-
ian idea of the aggregation of burden. A 
utilitarian is interested in a higher than 
average utility. This means that a utilitar-
ian would be prepared to, as it were, 
lump all individuals together if this pro-
vides higher than average benefits. But 
this could mean tolerating lower welfare 
for some if it brings higher welfare to 
others. A utilitarian would thus be pre-
pared to tolerate an unreasonable bur-
den for some and the absence thereof for 
others.
In other words, in the Scanlonian 
‘original position’ people are not only 
motivated by self-interest but also by the 
respect for others. Suppose, says Scan-
lon, that somebody holds out a principle 
that puts me in a very disadvantaged 
position. Such a position could involve 
essential bans to pursuing the way of life 
I regard as valuable. Is it for me reasona-
ble to reject them? If I manage to prove 
that there is at least one alternative set of 
principles under which I would be bet-
ter-off, then my rejection is reasonable. 
It would be unreasonable, however, to 
reject the offered principles and go for a 
set of principles that impose even more 
severe burden on others, and puts them 
in an even more disadvantaged position 
(Scanlon, 1982: 111). If you see that 
an alternative institutional arrangement 
brings benefit for me, but that this can 
be done only if this imposes the burden 
to you, it is reasonable for you to reject 
this arrangement.
Habermas and the Discourse Principle
Habermas’s debate with Rawls from 
1995 could perhaps lead to the conclu-
sion that Habermas himself does not 
endorse every step of the deontological 
groundwork I am trying to lay out here. 
Habermas namely raised an important 
remark as to why we should accept li-
beral principles. Rawls’s idea that we all 
have to do it for different reasons is, in 
Habermas’s view, inadequate. All those 
affected must, from the beginning, share 
a common point of view. Thus, in “Rec-
onciliation through the Public Use of 
Reason” he writes: ‘For only when 
self-understanding of each individual 
reflects a transcendental consciousness, 
that is, a universally valid view of the 
world, would what from my point of 
view is equally good for all actually be in 
the interest of each individual’ (Haber-
mas, 1998: 57). What Habermas essen-
tially says is that the principles of justice 
must be adopted for the right reason, not 
for different reasons, as Rawls suggests 
by his idea of overlapping consensus 
(Rawls, 1987).
I claim that the differences between 
Habermas and Rawls are not that insur-
mountable (much less than Habermas is 
prepared to admit when he says that the 
debate between him and Rawls is a fam-
ily quarrel), and that Habermas’s theory 
is able to supply the moral foundations 
for deontological liberalism.
Just like all deontological liberals, 
Ha bermas shares the view that the mod-
ern world is a disenchanted world set-
tled by divergent conceptions of the 
good life. This world lacks coordination 
which is supposed to be achieved by the 
communicative action of individuals. 
What Habermas protests against is the 
detachment of philosophy from real life. 
‘Practical philosophy has taken basic 
questions from everyday life in an un -
mediated way, treating these questions 
without the objectivating filter of social 
science. The renunciation of practical 
reasons signals a break with this naïve 
normativism’ (Habermas, 1996: 9). Crit-
























theory that does not provide actors with 
sufficient motivation for action, even 
when there are arguments to the contra-
ry (ibid.: 56-63), Habermas’s aim is to 
construct a theory that will be based on 
the union of theory and practice, at the 
same time expressing claims to universal 
truth.
Habermas’s own version of liberal-
ism is essentially based on strong episte-
mological grounds. This epistemological 
foundations are, in Habermas’s view, 
enabled by the replacement of practical 
reason with communicative reason. He 
writes that
[c]ommunicative reason differs from 
practical reason in that it is no longer 
ascribed to individual actor or a 
macro subject at the level of the state 
or the whole society. Rather what 
makes communicative reason possi-
ble is the linguistic medium through 
which interactions are woven to-
gether and forms of life are struc-
tured (Habermas, ibid.: 3-4).
Communicative reason operates in 
every community, but it is to be noted 
that it can produce true statements only 
if they are justified to others by abiding 
by the rules of communicative actions. 
Yet, what has to be valid ‘for us’ cannot 
only have ‘us’ as a reference point. ‘The 
reference to some particular interpreta-
tion community settled in its own par-
ticular form of life does not suffice.’ In 
order for validity claims to become real, 
they have to become transcendent in na-
 ture and ‘independent of the vagaries of 
me and you’ (ibid.: 14-5). Habermas says 
that validity claims are often in conflict 
in reality because they are too abstract. 
But this does not mean that their validity 
must be deprived of its theoretical ab-
stractedness and become exclusively 
real. Only those validity claims are valid, 
as it were, that are Janus-faced – namely, 
that, as claims, overshoot every context 
but are, at the same time, raised here and 
now. Without communicative reason 
‘participants could not even intend to 
reach an understanding with one anoth-
er about something in the world if they 
did not presuppose, on the basis of com-
mon (or translatable) language, that they 
conferred identical meanings on ex pres-
 sion they employed’ (ibid.: 19). Any rais-
 ed validity claim can be valid only if it is 
justified within a certain social context. 
The tension between facts and norms 
arises precisely when ‘the validity of true 
scientific statements enters into the fac-
ticity of the lifeworld’ (ibid.: 18).
I proceed with Habermas’s major 
worry which is identical to those of 
every deontological liberal: how to justi-
fy political principles so that even those 
who initially do not admit of them have 
good reason to adopt them. We, in other 
words, have to include others in arguing 
for political principles. To this purpose, 
he offers what he calls discourse prin-
ciple (D) to the effect that ‘just those 
 action norms are valid to which all pos-
sibly affected persons could agree as 
participants in rational discourses’ (Ha-
bermas, 1996: 107; 1998: 42). The (D) is 
accompanied by another basic principle 
called the principle of univerzalization 
(U), which goes as follows: ‘A norm is 
valid when the foreseeable consequenc-
es and side effects of its general obser-
vance for the interests and value-orien-
tation of each individual could be jointly 
accepted by all concerned without coer-
cion’ (Habermas, 1998: 42). This is, I 
claim, another variety of Rawls’s concept 
of the strains of commitment, or Scan-
lon’s test of reasonable rejection.
One of the features of deontological 
liberalism is that liberal principles are 
derived from a construction. One of the 











whatever comes out of a construction 
counts as just (Barry, 1989: 264-271). 
When Habermas says that, according to 
the discourse principle, ‘only those 
norms can claim validity that could meet 
with the agreement of all those con-
cerned in their capacity as participants 
in a practical discourse,’ he is actually 
saying that whatever comes out will be 
acceptable (i.e. just). But the major fea-
ture of (D) and (U) is that they both 
abide by what was mentioned as the fun-
damental liberal idea: that people are in 
some fundamental sense equal. The first 
indicator for this is the idea that every-
one has a veto to the principles that will 
regulate the basic structure of society. 
(D) is just another way of saying that no 
principle is agreed by anyone as long as 
it is not demonstrated to be acceptable 
to everyone.
Second, Habermas does not imme-
diately discuss what kind of political 
principles he has in mind, but it is obvi-
ous that all those who can be said to have 
a legitimate concern about these princi-
ples must have a final say over them. 
Thus, if (D) is employed to operate in an 
original position, it seems clear that it 
could bring about the just result only if it 
respects the initial equality among the 
parties, or if it gives equal respect for 
everyone’s conception of the good. (D) is 
neutral among various conceptions of 
the good and satisfies the requirement of 
impartiality. What (D) substantially pro-
vides for, then, is not an a priori limita-
tions of ‘the kinds of issues and contri-
butions and the sorts of reasons that 
“count” in each case.’ Its appeal lies in the 
fact that it gives everyone equal consid-
eration, thereby treating equally ‘all 
those who are possibly involved’ (Haber-
mas, 1996: 107-108)
Equality is the cornerstone of the 
Habermasian ‘original position.’ It is em-
bedded in communicative reason that in 
broad terms sets the constrains to the 
moral argument with which it can de-
fend the principles of justice. Rawls says 
that no principle is legitimate if it is 
derived from morally contingent facts. 
Scanlon says that a principle is wrong if 
it can be reasonably rejected. And Ha-
bermas says that the principle can be 
accepted only if all those affected by it 
could agree in a rational discourse. Note 
that what does the job in Habermas’s 
case is not the very idea that everyone 
has a chance to turn the principles down. 
The idea is rather to work out the condi-
tions under which the proposed princi-
ples can be rejected. In Rawls’s case these 
conditions are exemplified by the strains 
of commitment; in Scanlon’s, by the con-
cept of reasonableness; in Habermas’s 
view, they are set by communicative 
reason. Com municative reason is a con-
cept of which every participant in a ra-
tional discourse is aware. Discourse 
rules mandate that the interest of each is 
taken into consideration in an equal 
manner. Everyone has the right to ex-
press themselves and defend their con-
ceptions of the good in front of others.
Conclusion
The major claim of this essay is that 
the principles – which will be accepted 
at the ground floor within which the 
strains of commitment, reasonable re-
jection, or the discourse principle have a 
dominant status – are the principles that 
reflect the idea of equality. In all three 
discussed cases, we notice essentially the 
same claim: namely, that there are cer-
tain constraints on putting forward ar-
guments, or that burden cannot be im-
posed on other people that would limit 
their ability to defend their conception 
of the good when discussing principles 
























that people have some definite life plans 
and that they want to pursue these life 
plans in real life. Only these principles 
that will allow them to pursue them are 
acceptable. But if such principles are to 
be found by respecting the moral con-
straints formulated by Rawls, Scanlon or 
Habermas, then the equality of individ-
uals seems to be the only fundamental 
ideal by which the parties are situated 
because only this ideal will ensure that 
individuals will be able to select the 
principles enabling them to pursue their 
life plans without essential obstacles.
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Moralni temelji suvremenog liberalizma
Sažetak esej propituje temelje suvremenog liberalizma. Autor brani sljedeću tezu. Pre ­
mise suvremene liberalne teorije ne mogu izbjeći referiranje na ideal jednakosti pojedi­
naca. Jednakost je načelo na kojem se temelji teorija iz koje se izvode principi potrebni za 
organiziranje liberalnih institucija. Da bi obranio ovu tezu, autor razlikuje opravdavajući 
od perfekcionističkog liberalizma, te razmatra neke od najutjecajnijih teorija suvremene 
političke filozofije koje nude etičke temelje suvremenom liberalizmu.
Ključne riječi Suvremeni liberalizam, perfekcionizam, nepristranost, neutralnost, jedna­
kost
